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Governments have come under increasing pressure to promote horizontal flows of information
across agencies, but investment in cross-agency interoperable and standard systems have been
minimally made since it seems to require government agencies to give up the autonomies in
managing own systems and its outcomes may be subject to many external and interaction risks. By
producing an agent-based model using 'Blanche' software, this study provides policy-makers with a
simulation-based demonstration illustrating how government agencies can autonomously and
interactively build, standardize, and operate interoperable IT systems in a decentralized environment.
This simulation designs an illustrative body of 20 federal agencies and their missions. A multiplicative
production function is adopted to model the interdependent effects of heterogeneous systems on joint
mission capabilities, and six social network drivers (similarity, reciprocity, centrality, mission priority,
interdependencies, and transitivity) are assumed to jointly determine inter-agency system utilization.
This exercise simulates five policy alternatives derived from joint implementation of three policy
levers (IT investment portfolio, standardization, and inter-agency operation). The simulation results
show that modest investments in standard systems improve interoperability remarkably, but that a
wide range of untargeted interoperability with lagging operational capabilities improves mission
capability less remarkably. Nonetheless, exploratory modeling against the varying parameters for
technology, interdependency, and social capital demonstrates that the wide range of untargeted
interoperability responds better to uncertain future states and hence reduces the variances of joint
mission capabilities. In sum, decentralized and adaptive investments in interoperable and standard
systems can enhance joint mission capabilities substantially and robustly without requiring radical
changes toward centralized IT management.
Public IT Investment, Interoperability, Standardization, Social Network, Agent-Based Modeling,
Exploratory Modeling
 Introduction
The dominant structural forms in all the governments have been stovepipe organizational units, so
information systems have been optimized to form agency-centric vertically integrated systems. As
many contemporary policy challenges span multiple policy domains, public organizations have come
under increasing pressure to promote horizontal flows of information, work and decision-making
across functional boundaries (Agranoff 2003; Kohtamaki et al. 2008). However, studies of networking





or easily transformed (Fountain 2001; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Lazer and Binz-Scharf 2004).
Networking governments requires two steps of transformational efforts: 1) efforts to identify
complementary systems across agencies and improve their interoperability or reusability, and 2)
inter-organizational operation of the interoperable systems to achieve missions effectively.
Information systems can become interoperable by coupling them either bilaterally (i.e. point-to-point)
or multi-laterally (i.e. through a standard middleware). Compared with point-to-point couplings,
integration through standard systems can achieve a wide range of interoperability. Centralized
management of government-wide information systems can promote cross-agency consolidation of
potentially redundant systems into shared services and improve the interoperability of information
systems through standard middleware. However, centralized management is disadvantageous to
decentralized management (i.e. local control of information systems) in regards to encouraging field
offices to understand their unique information needs and allocate scarce resources responsibly, and
facilitating user adaptation and innovation (Libicki 2000). In addition, although standardization can
achieve a wide range of interoperability, the short-term return on investment may be smaller (i.e. less
cost-effective) than that of targeted point-to-point couplings that can achieve performance gains
immediately (Kaye 2003).
After systems become made interoperable, it takes time for potential users to appreciate the
complementary values of interoperable systems of other agencies and utilize these systems.
Fountain (2002) claims that objective technology and enacted technology need to be distinguished
since many intergovernmental information systems have not been productively utilized by
government workers. If investment in technological interoperability is not matched with inter-
organizational operational capability, interoperable system capacities will be left under-utilized.
Although system integration may be managed from a top-down perspective, inter-agency system
operations are steered only by a variety of incentives and sanctions because they are carried out by
self-governing agencies. Overall, the value gained from investment in standard systems is subject to
internal uncertainties (with regards to system integration), external uncertainties (with regards to
social demands and technology changes), and particularly interaction risk (with regards to network
effects, evolving inter-agency collaborative capability and underlying social networks).
We have identified two obstacles to cross-agency standardization. First, standardization seems to
require individual agencies to give up the autonomies in managing their own systems to allow a
central commander to manage them on behalf of them. Second, many uncertain factors affect the
values of standard systems, making investment in standard systems a highly risky business. Due to
these two barriers, investments in cross-agency standard systems and efforts to build collaborative
operational capabilities have been minimally made in most nations.
To reduce the dilemma between empowering the central managers to assure the cross-agency
interoperability and empowering the local managers to responsibly accomplish their unique
missions, it is necessary to standardize common systems and interfaces, and to let individual
agencies build specialized applications tailored to their own missions on top of these standard
systems. Malone (2004) notes that "Rigid standards in the right parts of a system can enable much
more flexibility and decentralization in other parts of the system". Only those parts that are identified
as involving important economies of scale without undermining the qualities of services need to be
standardized, and everything else can be decentralized to suit unique service needs.
The risks associated with investment in standard systems can be also mitigated by selective and
adaptive standardization. The National Task Force on Interoperability (2003) emphasizes the
importance of strategic experimentation and adaptive implementation.
Improving interoperability is a complex endeavor. There are no "one size fits all"
solutions. It may require agencies and jurisdictions to develop new and improved
working relationships and could involve substantial changes in how individual agencies
operate in terms of communication. Expect to make progress, but allow adequate time
for the progress to be substantial. Sometimes the most progress is made through small






steps that test strategies and approaches. (National Task Force on Interoperability 2003)
This research attempts to test two hypotheses.
Decentralized investments in interoperable and standard systems by autonomous
agencies can substantially improve joint mission capabilities.
Although the values of standard systems are subject to various uncertainties, the
variances of outcomes generated from standard systems will not increase significantly if
investment in standard systems are made modestly and adaptively.
In sum, decentralized and adaptive IT investments along with modest standardization—without
requiring radical changes toward centralized IT management—can improve joint mission capabilities
substantially and robustly.
Kaplan and Norton (2001) list the difficulties of estimating the contribution of information systems to
value creation: 1) Improvement in information systems does not directly affect final outcomes but
only through chains of cause-and-effect involving two or three intermediate stages. 2) Information
systems have only potential value (i.e. system development cost is a poor approximation of any
realizable value), and organization process are required to transform this potential value to realized
value. 3) The value of a system is interdependent with that of the systems with which it is networked.
These difficulties are especially evident with standard systems that indirectly affect a wide range of
systems and inter-organizational processes. Despite many manuals for IT investment, investments
in improving interoperability and building standard systems have rarely benefited from the simulation
of adaptive policy implementation.
This research attempts to validate the long-term dynamic effects of decentralized and adaptive
investments in interoperable and standard systems, using an agent-based modeling methodology
that simulates the uncontrolled dynamics that independent actors in a network may interactively
create. As shown in Table 1, the ultimate outcome of IT investment is 'joint mission capability', but not
interoperable system capacity that is just intermediate output. Although a production function for joint
mission capabilities is given as an exogenously imposed system of equations, each agency is
designed to autonomously and interactively determine its own IT portfolio, standardization policy, and
system operation (no central commander controls information systems of individual agencies). The
productivity of interoperable systems will be explicitly modeled as an endogenous social network
function instead of being left as exogenously given parameters. Exploratory modeling—by varying the
highly uncertain parameters for technology progress, interdependencies, and inter-agency system
utilization—will test the robustness of each policy alternative in terms of the variances of outcomes.












































 Assumptions for Network Economics
Overview and Relationships
This study implements an agent-based computational simulation using 'Blanche' software (version
4.6.5)[1]. The objects that make up a model are nodes, attributes, and relations. A node represents a
government agency, and an attribute is a numerical value that defines a property of a node. Each
node has heterogeneous attributes. A relation is a set of numerical values that define interactions
among N nodes using an N by N matrix. Each relation has an equation that describes how its
interactions with other autonomous agents mutually and endogenously change over time. For
instance, agencies often do not sufficiently invest in coupling complementary but highly disparate
systems of other agencies due to limited awareness and difficulty in integrating incongruent systems.
Even after systems of other agencies become technically interoperable, the limited understanding
about how data are created and used may still constrain their utilization. Hence, the degree of
similarity between agencies can affect not only the investment in improving interoperability but also
the readiness to utilize interoperable systems across agencies.
By referring to the Business Reference Model of the U.S. Federal Enterprise Architecture (OMB
2005), this modeling exercise defines 20 agencies as an illustrative body of the federal government.
Each of 20 agencies builds its own system to serve its distinct mission[2]. The system of the i-th
agency will be hereafter called the i-th system, and the mission of the j-th agency will be hereafter
called the j-th mission ({i ∈ N : 1 ≤ i ≤ 20} and {j∈N : 1 ≤ j ≤ 20}).
This study will model heterogeneous relations (including network benefits and coupling costs) among
systems that have heterogeneous service attributes and levels. Network benefits and coupling costs
among 20 systems will be unevenly and asymmetrically distributed, and described using discrete
and non-parametric 20 by 20 matrices.2.4
2.5
Figure 1. Matrix of Interdependencies among Systems and Missions of 20 Agencies
(The Department of Interior has identified complex interdependencies among multiple agencies and multiple
missions as the matrix of binary values. By referring to this matrix, the contributions of complementary systems
to missions are scored between 0 and 5, and the contributions of the own systems (diagonal cells) are scored
as 20. Then, these scores are normalized to the relative contribution of the i-th system to the j-th mission (wi.j).)
Figure 1 illustrates the matrix of interdependent network benefits—i.e. the relative contributions of the
i-th system to the j-th mission (denoted as wi.j). Coupling costs are derived from disparity between
systems (denoted as di.q). The sophistication levels for the i-th system (denoted as Pi.q) are
assessed along 11 service attributes (e.g. citizen services, e-Business, multimedia data, and
technology level), and disparities between the i-th and the j-th system are calculated as: dij =
ʣq=1
11(Max(Pi.q—Pj.q , 0)).
Network Values: Production Function of Mission Capabilities
We now introduce the concept of a core system which is defined as the unique system of an agency
to serve its own principal mission. The service level of the core system will be called 'core (system)





also generate complementary values to other agencies serving different missions. However,
heterogeneous core systems are incompatible with each other, so middleware or interfaces are
needed to make a core system interoperable with another core system. 'Interoperable capacity' of the
i-th system for the j-th mission (denoted as xi,j i ≠ j ) is a portion of the core system capacity of the i-th
agency that is interoperable with the core system of the j-th agency (i ≠ j) and hence contributable to
the j-th mission (see Figure 3).
The mission capability (Uj) in this exercise is jointly produced from a core system and nineteen
interoperable systems that are operated through inter-agency interactions. A multiplicative (as
opposed to additive) functional form is adopted to model the interdependent effects among
heterogeneous systems. The relative contributions of the i-th system to the j-th mission (denoted as
wi.j) are assumed to be exogenously given. This production function is assumed to exhibit constant
returns to scale (i.e. ʣ i=1
20
 wij = 1). The mission capability equation for the j-th mission, denoted as
Uj, is given by:
Uj = Aj x1.j
 w1.j x2.j
 w2.j x3.j
 w3.j … x20.j
w20.j (1)
Aj represents the total factor productivity, that is, the joint productivity of the twenty interdependent
systems. To define the total factor productivity, the concept of an 'enacted (or activated) interoperable
capacity' (denoted as exi,j) is introduced. Technically interoperable capacity (xij.t) can be transformed
to enacted interoperable capacity through organizational efforts to utilize interoperable systems
across agencies. That is, the gap between the current technically interoperable capacity (xij.t) and
the previous enacted interoperable capacity (exij.(t-1)) is filled by adding the utilization rate (denoted
as ˆij ; 0 ≤ ˆij ≤ 1) times the gap at each time step. As a dynamic model, time step is indexed using
subscript "t".
exij.t = ˆij.t (xij.t - exij.(t-1)) + exij.(t-1) = ˆij.t xij.t + (1 - ˆij.t) exij.(t-1) (2)
This utilization rate will be defined using social network parameters as shown in equation (10).
Productivity of a given agency will be higher when the agency is more innovative (measured by
technology level) and more actively utilizing interoperable capacities. Hence, this exercise defines
productivity as a function of technology levels and enacted interoperable capacities. The productivity
equation for the j-th mission is given by (0 ≤ Aj ≤ 1):
Aj = w1.j
 (ex1.j / x1.j ) + … + wj.j
 (Techj / Techmax) + … + w20.j
(ex20.j / x20.j )
(3)
Cost Functions for Investment Alternatives
A total federal IT budget (denoted as Mt) is allocated to core system capacities (Mi.t), interoperable
capacities (Mi.j.t i ≠ j ), mission-centric standard capacities (Mall.j.t) and government-wide standard
capacities (Mall.all.t). A cost function converts budgets (money) into system capacities. This exercise
assumes that system capacities incrementally expand as sequential modules over time (i.e. xi.j.t =
C-1(Mi.j.t) + xi.j.t-1).
This exercise assumes that the cost of developing core system capacity is a convex function with an







Core systems of other agencies can be reused via bilateral point-to-point interfaces. Developing an
interface to couple and reuse an existing system is assumed to be scale-independent, so the
coupling cost is defined as a linear function of interoperable capacity and distance with an inverse of
evolving technology level.
(5)
In order to fully couple 20 systems with bilateral point-to-point interfaces, 380 (=20 ￗ 19) interfaces
are needed. Alternatively, mission-centric or government-wide standard systems may be built. The
cost of developing a standard system is assumed to be proportional to the needed scope to cover
the given heterogeneity. The needed standard scope for a mission-centric interoperability, Sj, is
defined as the sum of the distances between the j-th agency and all other agencies. The needed
standard scope for a government-wide common standard, Sall, is the sum of distances between the
maximum (Pmax.q) and the minimum (Pmin.q) across 11 service categories.
(6)
(ʴ : the rate of cost saving due to standardization (0<ʴ<1)[3] )
(7)
While building a standard system is at least Si or Sall times as costly as building non-standardized
incompatible systems, doing so saves additional investments in numerous point-to-point interfaces
since it is designed to be interoperable with all other systems. The mission-centric standard capacity
is added to all of 19 interoperable capacities for a given mission (xi,all i ≠ j ), and the government-wide
standard capacity is added to all of 380 interoperable capacities (xall,all i ≠ j ).
In sum, core system capacity and interoperable capacity build up over time as follows:
(8)
(9)
 Agent-based Modeling of Network Dynamics
Network-centric public services are realized through investment in and operation of cross-agency
interoperable capacities. Using an agent-based modeling framework that combines network
economics and social network analysis, this exercise will simulate not only the effects of inter-
agency IT investment policy levers but also the effects of inter-agency system operation policy levers
to better understand the co-evolution between technology and organization. Particularly, social
network analysis methodology will be applied to model inter-agency collaborative operation, i.e. the
uncontrolled dynamics that independent actors in a network may interactively create.
Social Network Drivers
Because the organizational mechanism of intergovernmental operations is complex and many
factors influence it, this exercises adopts the multi-theoretical, multi-level social network modeling
approach (Monge and Noshir 2003). Various social network theories have attended to a wide range of






management and social capital (Katz and Lazer 2002). Multiple theories can jointly improve an
explanation of network evolution. Multiple levels of analysis are also needed because network
properties exist at the individual, dyad, triad, and global network levels (e.g. reciprocity at the dyad
level and transitivity at the triad level).
In the absence of empirical data on inter-organizational operation of a standard system, this exercise
will simulate the hypothetical effects of six social network drivers (similarity, reciprocity, centrality,
mission priority, interdependencies, and transitivity) to illustrate how autonomous agents operate
them in a decentralized environment over time.
In the case of the first characteristic, social networks can be biased toward similarity (e.g. technical
and semantic similarity) since similarity may ease communication and increase the predictability of
behavior. In the case of the second, reciprocity often plays an important role in building trust in non-
hierarchical relationships. In the case of the third, centrality in relations is important. Barabasi and
Bonabeau (2003) assert that preferential attachment (or the "rich get richer" process) explains the
growth of hubs. That is, new nodes tend to connect to popular nodes, so the hubs acquire even more
links over time than the less connected nodes. In the case of the fourth, agencies may tend to build
more social links with other agencies in charge of more socially demanded missions. In the case of
the fifth, an agency may build more social links with other agencies that operate highly
complementary systems. Finally, an agency may develop relationships with another agency through
other (intermediary) agencies that have close ties with that agency. This indirect relationship is called
'transitivity', and this may help extend social networks with other agencies.
This exercise defines the utilization rate (denoted as ˆij) of the interoperable capacity xi,j as a







ʺ6 )˄(0 ≤ ˆij ≤ 1) (10)
(˄: scale factor; ʺk: weight of the k-th factor)
These six factors are powered by weights (denoted as ʺ1~ʺ6) and multiplied together to construct
the inter-agency system utilization rate function. Inter-agency system operation policy is assumed to
affect these weights to six factors. The multiplied value of the six factors is between 0 and 1, so when
the scale factor (denoted as ˄) in the exponent is less than one, the utilization ratio becomes
magnified.
Technology Innovations and Diffusions
The technology equation consists of an innovation equation and an imitation equation in a continuous
scale. Technology level for the i-th agency (Techi.t) is defined as:
Techi.t = TechInovi.t-1 ￗ Techgri + ʣj=1
20((exji / ʣ ex ji) ￗ ˆij ￗ
Max(Techj(t-1) -TechInovi.t , 0))
(11)
The technology innovation equation (denoted as TechInovi.t) assumes that agencies build up
technology level with heterogeneous technology growth rates (denoted as Techgri ; 1.05 ≤ Techgri ≤
1.105). While agencies with higher technology growth rates build up their technology levels on their
own, other agencies catch up with them through imitation. Social network plays an important role in
technology diffusion, so the technology imitation equation includes the utilization rate ˆij . The
technology imitation function is the weighted average of the technology gaps multiplied by the
utilization rates (weighted by exji / ʣ  j=1
20exji). While different innovation capacities widen
technological distance over time, technology imitations reduce technological distance.




This modeling exercise aims to simulate the joint effects of three policy levers (IT investment
portfolio, standardization, and inter-agency operation). For IT investment portfolio lever and inter-
agency operation policy lever, this study will compare 'agency-centric (or supplier-centric)' and
'mission-centric (or citizen-centric)' approaches.
Agency-centric vs. Mission-centric IT investment portfolio: Individual agencies allocate a given
budget to the development of not only their own systems but also interfaces and middleware
that couple complementary systems of other agencies. The investment portfolio is often biased
toward their own systems and linkages with similar systems, and this study will call such a
biased portfolio 'agency-centric'. When the investment portfolio is aligned with the optimal
interdependencies without bias, such portfolio will be called 'mission-centric'.
Agency-centric vs. Mission-centric operation of interoperable systems: This study assumes
that six social network drivers jointly determine inter-agency system operation. When similarity
and reciprocity are dominant drivers, this study will call such operations 'agency-centric'.
When cross-agency interdependencies and transitivity are dominant drivers, such operations
will be called 'mission-centric'.
Bilateral coupling vs. Multi-lateral standardization: With bilateral coupling alternatives,
complementary systems are integrated via point-to-point interfaces. Standardization can be
made for specific missions (e.g. public safety, and healthcare) or for government-wide shared
services and protocols (e.g. next-generation Internet protocol, authentication, and information
security). Standardizing government-wide shared services requires a high level of cross-
agency coordination.
This exercise derives five alternatives (Alt0 - Alt4) as joint implementation of three policy levers. Alt0 is
a business-as-usual ('do-nothing') policy that maintains 'agency-centric IT investment portfolio with
no investment in standard system and agency-centric operation of interoperable systems'. Since it
provides a baseline for evaluation of the joint effects of three policy levers, it will be called 'baseline
policy'. Alt1, Alt2 and Alt3 are 'do-something' alternatives that implement one or two policy levers. Alt4
is a comprehensive ('do-everything') policy that implements mission-centric IT portfolio and operation
with modest investment in not only mission-centric standard systems but also government-wide
standard systems.
All the five policy alternatives are implemented using the same amount of federal IT budget (Mt), and
the federal budget is allocated to the j-th agency according to its mission weight (i.e. Mj.t = wj.t Mt)[4].
Decision variables for each agency to implement three policy levers are: 1) Mi.j.t, 2) Mall.j.t, Mall.t and
3) ʺ1~ʺ6 in ˆij.
The baseline policy (Alt0) allocates the budgets proportionally to each system's contribution weights
and the inverse of distance (Mi.j.t ∝ wi.j.t / dijt). On the other hand, the other alternatives implement
the mission-centric IT portfolio policy by allocating the budgets proportionally to the system's
contribution weights (Mi.j.t ∝ wi.j.t)[5]. On top of the mission-centric IT portfolio policy lever, four
alternatives (Alt1-4) are generated as the combinations of the two longer-term drivers:
standardization policy and inter-agency operational policy (see Table 2).
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Standardization policies (Alt2 and Alt4) allocate a small portion (five percent[6]) of IT budgets to the
development of standard systems. While Alt2 (agency-centric operation) builds only decentralized
mission-centric standard systems (Mall.j.t=.05 M j.t), Alt4 (mission-centric operation) is assumed to
build coordinated government-wide standard systems (Mall.t=.02 Mt) as well as decentralized
mission-centric standard systems (Mall.j.t=.03 Mj.t).
The inter-agency operational policy lever is simulated using two sets of weights assigned to the six
social network drivers in the system utilization equation (ʺ1~ʺ6 in ˆij) as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Social Network Drivers and their Contribution Weights to
Utilization Rates







Relative Distance between the i-th
and j-th agency (=dmin/dij)
0.3 0.1
Relative Reciprocity in relations
with j-th agency (=exji/exmax)
0.2 0.1
Relative Degree Centrality* of j-th
agency (=centj/centmax)
0.2 0.2
Relative Priority of the j-th mission
(=wj/wmax)
0.1 0.1
Relative Contribution of the i-th
system xij (=wij/wmax)
0.1 0.3
Relative Transitivity in relations (i-k-
j)**
0.1 0.2
* Degree centrality measures the number of incoming and/or outgoing connections with others.
** The transitive relations of the i-th agency with j-th agency via all other (intermediary k-th) nodes
are computed as trij = .05 ʣk=1
20 (exik + exkj)/2. They are averaged across k (weighted by the
value of links with intermediary node k). Relative transitive relations are computed as (trij / ex ij).
 Results of Agent-based Modeling of Network Dynamics5.1 This exercise adopts a cost-effectiveness analysis framework that searches for the maximum
effectiveness subject to a given budget. The key measure of effectiveness is joint mission capability
at the final period. Each mission capability (Uj) is defined as an independent building-block, and the
joint value of mission capabilities is defined as the weighted average: ʣ j
20
 wjUj. The mission
weights (i.e. the relative importance of mission j; denoted as wj) are assumed to be exogenous[7] and
normalized ( ʣ j
20
 wj = 1). Each time step represents one year, and this exercise runs for 20 time
steps to simulate long-term effects. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the average system capacities,
productivities, and mission capabilities generated from this simulation. The mission-centric IT
portfolio with mission-centric standards (Alt2) builds much larger interoperable capacities than
bilateral coupling policies (Alt0,1&3), and the mission-centric IT portfolio including both mission-
centric and government-wide standards (Alt4) achieves by far the largest interoperable capacities.
Productivities rapidly drop with the upsurge of interoperable capacities generated from
standardization (Alt2&4) in the early periods, but productivity soon rebounds with the mission-centric
operation policy (Alt4).5.2
5.3
Figure 2. Evolution of System Capacity, Productivity, and Mission Capability
A remarkable enhancement of the joint mission capabilities beyond the baseline level (Alt0) comes
from the adoption of mission-centric IT portfolio policy (Alt1) through its better alignment with the
optimally diversified system portfolio. Once the mission-centric IT investment portfolio policy is
implemented, either standardization (Alt2) or mission-centric operation (Alt3) increases the mission
capability further. When investment in standard systems and mission-centric operation are
simultaneously implemented (Alt4), their joint effects on joint mission capabilities are substantially
improved through positive feedback loops between interoperable capacities and productivities over
time. The gain of alternative 2 over alternative 1 is 26%, the gain of alternative 3 over alternative 1 is
20%, and the gain of alternative 4 over alternative 1 is 71% (far exceeding the sum of the gains from
alternative 2 and 3). Nonetheless, this gain of mission capabilities (71%) is not as dramatic as the
gain of interoperable system capacities (152%) due to the untargeted expansion of interoperable
capacities by standardization.
The graphs and matrices in Figure 3 present the technically interoperable capacities (xi,j) and6.1
6.2
enacted (activated) interoperable capacities (exi,j) generated from the simulation exercise. While the
sum of activated interoperable capacities (1340) by the DOD with all other agencies is just four times
its core system capacity (381), the sum of activated interoperable capacities (484) by the GSA far
exceeds ten times its core system capacity (36). This shows that agencies in charge of government-
wide common management and support functions can create more values from expanding and
activating inter-agency interoperable systems rather than from building its own core system
capacities.
Figure 3. Interoperable System Network and Activated System Network (Alternative 4 at
time=20; presented using the UCINET software)
In the above matrix and graph, the diagonal cells and the node sizes represent the core system capacities, and
the non-diagonal cells and the thicknesses of arcs represent the interoperable capacities. Likewise, in the below
matrix and graph, the diagonal cells and the node sizes represent the degree centrality (i.e. the sum of all the
links) of each agency, and the non-diagonal cells and the thicknesses of arcs represent the activated(enacted)
interoperable capacities.
 Exploratory Modeling for Assessing the Robustness
Identifying Critical Uncertainties and Generating Scenarios
Some of parameter values adopted in the previous simulation exercise are in fact highly uncertain.
The priorities citizens assign to various missions may change as economic and social environments
evolve. Technology progress is hard to predict precisely. The interdependencies among
complementary systems for mission capabilities also continue to change. The inter-governmental
relations such as technology diffusion and social networking among federal agencies are very
complex. All these uncertain parameters jointly affect the robustness of final outcomes.
Since policy-makers and citizens are often risk-averse, reducing the sensitivity of outcomes against
varying parameters are as important as increasing the levels of the most likely outcomes for each
alternative. This exercise hypothesizes that technology development, mission priority, system-




The baseline parameters values used in the previous section are: the scale factor (˄) in the utilization
rate equation = 1, the average technology growth rate = 7.5%, and the increasing weights to
complementary systems (wi,j i ≠ j ) [8]. By taking advantage of both parametric and probabilistic
exploratory modeling in a complementary way (as shown in Table 4), this study will test the
robustness of policy alternatives. Parametric exploratory analysis will generate 18 scenarios as the
combination of multiple values for three uncertain parameters. Probabilistic exploratory analysis will
generate 100 simulations as the combination of parameter values randomly drawn from the
probabilistic distribution functions.





Weights of the i-th systems for the










(ʼ = ˃ =7.5%)
The scale factor (˄) of the
utilization rate function**
0.5, 1, and 1.5 N(1, 0.05)
Weights of missions (wj) N(1, 0.03)
* Given the lock-in effects arising from network standards, information technologies are more likely
disruptively leaping than incrementally improving. Hence, the probabilistic modeling of technology
innovation equation will adopt a Poisson distribution function.
** Since the utilization rate lies between 0 and 1, a higher exponent means a lower utilization
scenario. High scale factor of the utilization rate function may mean that social capital across
agencies is high.
Parametric Exploratory Modeling
Figure 4 shows the weighed average of mission capabilities. The robustness of each alternative can
be measured in terms of the coefficients of variation (= standard deviation / mean). The coefficients of
variation across 18 scenarios for five alternatives are : 28.3% (Alt0), 33.6% (Alt1), 29.9% (Alt2),
30.7% (Alt3), and 25.6% (Alt4). The outcomes of most mission-centric IT investment portfolio
alternatives (Alt1-Alt3) turn out to be more sensitive to various uncertainty factors than the baseline
scenario. However, the comprehensive policy including modest investment in government-wide
standard systems (Alt4) minimizes the coefficient of variation while maximizing the expected values.
Probabilistic Exploratory Modeling
The probabilistic exploratory modeling has generated stochastically-evolving mission priority weights
(wj) and system's relative contribution weights (wi.j) over time. To respond to changing mission
weights over time, budget allocation has been adaptively made proportional to the magnitude of gaps
between the desirable portfolio and the current portfolio.
Standardization policies (Alt2&4) mitigate the coefficients of variation of the interoperable capacities,
and the mission-centric operation policies (Alt3&4) mitigate the coefficients of variation of the
productivities. Again, as shown in Figure 5, the comprehensive policy including modest investment in
government-wide standard systems (Alt4) minimizes the coefficient of variation of the mission
capabilities while maximizing their expected outcome.7.1
7.2
Figure 4. Joint Mission Capabilities from the Parametric Exploratory Modeling
Figure 5. Joint Mission Capabilities Generated from Probabilistic Exploratory Modeling
 Summary of Modeling and Policy Implications
While these modeling exercises are highly abstract, speculative and merely suggestive, the results
demonstrate that when autonomous agencies build more mission-centric (rather than agency-
centric) IT portfolios, invest in standard systems modestly, and build more mission-centric (rather
than agency-centric) relationships with other agencies, an encouraging evolutionary trajectory can be
produced without any central commander.
Standardization improves interoperability among a broad range of systems while point-to-point
interfaces selectively couple only highly complementary systems. Building operational capabilities7.3
7.4
that activate a wide range of interoperable capacities takes time. Hence, small investments in
standard systems improve a wide range of interoperability remarkably (by 152%), but such
untargeted interoperable capacities with lagging operational capabilities improve joint mission
capability less remarkably (by 71%). Nonetheless, such untargeted interoperable capacities may
improve the robustness of mission capabilities faced with highly uncertain future states. Both the
parametric and the probabilistic exploratory modeling confirm that modest investment in standard
systems jointly with mission-centric operation not only enhances the expected outcome but also
reduces the variances of outcomes against varying parameters for technology progress,
interdependency, and inter-agency operation.
These findings confirm our two hypotheses, demonstrating that decentralized and adaptive
investments in interoperable and standard systems—as long as individual agencies adopt mission-
centric IT investment and operation approaches—can improve joint mission capabilities substantially
and robustly without requiring radical changes toward centralized IT management.
Identifying appropriate scale or scope of standard system remains to be a difficult task for further
research. This simulation exercise illustrates that a number of cross-agency social network drivers
can significantly and substantially affect inter-agency operational readiness, and consequently the
added values of standard systems. Empirical research on inter-agency social network mechanisms
can help better estimate the productivities of cross-agency interoperable and standard systems, and
hence provide useful information for deciding appropriate scale and scope of cross-agency standard
systems.
 Notes
1Blanche is a program designed to evaluate a hypothesis by simulating computational models of
evolutionary network dynamics. Blanche is developed under the direction of N. Contractor at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
2The twenty distinct missions include 16 citizen service missions (Community and social services,
Defense, Economic development, Education, Energy, Environmental management, General science,
Health, Homeland security, Income security, International affairs, Law enforcement, Natural
resources, Transportation, Workforce management, and Revenue collection and Finance) and four
management functions (HR management, Public asset management, Public records management,
and Budget planning).
3In this simulation, ʴ is assumed to be 0.3.
4The initial value of the total IT budget (M0) and mission weights (wj) are derived from the actual U.S.
IT budget in FY2003. This simulation assumes 7 percent annual growth of the federal IT budget
(Mt=1.07t-1 M0).
5If the budget for a point-to-point interface is allocated more than needed to exploit the full capacity of
the original system, the agency is assumed to either expend the surplus budget within its
organizational boundary through building its own non-core system redundantly (the agency-centric
system operation policies: Alt0,1&2) or transfer the surplus budgets to the agency in charge of the
original system to consolidate the system development (the mission-centric system operation
policies: Alt3&4).
6The 'e-Government fund' authorized during the Bush administration to support the Presidential e-
Government initiatives is an example of investment in standard systems. The E-Gov fund ($345
million over four years) is less than 0.2 percent of the federal IT budget. Five percent seems to be an
ambitious yet realistic target.7The initial mission weights (at t=0) are assumed to be proportional to the actual federal IT budgets in
FY 2003. 8The weights to the complementary systems grow by 1 percent each time step (wi,j.t =
1.01 wi,j.t-1 ; i ≠ j ), and then all the weights are normalized.
Consequently, the average weight to own core systems (wi.i.t) gradually diminishes from 0.484 at
time=1 to 0.435 at t=20.
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